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OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
According to our data, 38.5% of S&P 1500 firms have at least one professor on their boards. 
Given the lack of research examining the roles and effects of academic faculty as members of 
boards of directors (professor-directors) on corporate outcomes, this study investigates 
whether firms with professor-directors are more likely to exhibit higher corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance ratings. Results indicate that firms with professor-directors 
do exhibit higher CSR performance ratings than those without. However, the influence of 
professor-directors on firm CSR performance ratings depends on their academic 
background—the positive association between the presence of professor-directors and firm 
CSR performance ratings is significant only when their academic background is specialized 
(e.g., science, engineering and medicine). Finally, this positive association weakens when 
professor-directors hold an administrative position at their universities. 
 
Keywords: academic; board of directors; corporate governance; corporate social 
responsibility; professor. 
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PROFESSORS ON THE BOARD: DO THEY CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETY 
OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM? 
 
 
Introduction 
This study examines whether firms with academic faculty members on the board of 
directors (i.e., professor-directors) are more likely to exhibit higher corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance ratings. Anderson et al. (2011) find that board members 
with heterogeneous/diverse backgrounds bring valuable experience, knowledge, resources, 
and perspectives to the boardroom to make the board of directors monitor and/or advise 
managers more effectively. The extant literature on corporate governance and boards of 
directors suggests that board composition and its characteristics affect business outcomes 
such as corporate policy and financial performance (see Adams and Ferreira 2009; Baysinger 
et al. 1991; Cohen et al. 2012; Hill and Snell 1988; Masulis et al. 2012; Valentine and 
Fleishman 2008; Wang and Coffey 1992; Williams 2003).  
Many firms appoint university professors as members of their board of directors. 
According to our data, 38.5% of S&P 1500 firms have at least one professor-director. As is 
the case for various types of directors documented in prior literature (e.g., female, foreigner, 
banker, analyst, and labor union member), university professors have specific characteristics 
that may affect firm performance (e.g., Francis et al. 2014). Tierney (1997) suggests that the 
three key responsibilities of professors are research, teaching, and service to the university 
and to the community, all of which contribute to society in the long-term. Moreover, 
academics are, in general, perceived to possess relatively higher ethical and socially 
responsible standards (Baumgarten 1982; Bowman 2005; Charnov 1987; Chickering and 
Gamson 1999; O’Connell 1998; Tierney 1997). Thus, university professors who possess 
some in-depth knowledge and a sense of responsibility about both business and society are 
likely to constitute an important factor that may affect corporate policy and/or performance. 
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However, there is little research directly examining the roles and effects of professor-
directors on corporate outcomes (e.g., Francis et al. 2014). To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to investigate whether professor-directors may affect firm outcomes with a 
specific focus on CSR performance ratings. Prior literature reveals that firm CSR 
performance is influenced by the characteristics of their board members. For example, firms 
with female board members are more likely to engage in CSR activities (Mesch et al. 2011; 
Williams 2003). Also, Valentine and Fleishman (2008) report that firms are more likely to be 
involved in CSR activities when the members on the corporate board have higher levels of 
professional ethical standards.  
In this paper, therefore, we investigate whether the presence of professor-directors is 
associated with CSR performance ratings. Further, we examine post-hoc whether the impact 
of having professor-directors on CSR performance ratings depends on their academic 
background. Finally, we investigate whether having professor-directors who hold an 
administrative position (e.g., Dean, President, Chancellor, etc.) at their universities has a 
different impact on CSR performance ratings compared to professor-directors without such 
administrative positions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
relevant prior literature and develop our research question. We then describe the data and 
present the descriptive statistics of our professor-director sample. Finally, we present our 
results and provide our conclusions and implications. 
Prior Literature and Research Question 
Board Heterogeneity and Corporate Outcomes 
Numerous studies have investigated the link between board heterogeneity and 
corporate outcomes (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Anderson et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2012; 
Fich 2005; Güner et al. 2008; Hillman et al. 2000, 2001; Masulis et al. 2012; Mesch et al. 
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2011; Williams 2003).1 Following Anderson et al. (2011), we classify board heterogeneity 
into two categories – social heterogeneity (e.g., gender, age, and ethnicity) and occupational 
heterogeneity (e.g., education, experience, and profession) – and review the related literature 
as follows. 
First, as to social heterogeneity in a board, a number of studies have examined the 
impact of director gender on firm performance and operations (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 
2009; Mesch et al. 2011; Willams 2003). In particular, Williams (2003) investigates the 
impact of female directors on corporate philanthropy and finds that the number of female 
directors is positively associated with the level of a firm’s involvement in corporate 
philanthropy. Williams classifies the overall philanthropy activities into four specific types of 
charitable giving (educational organizations; community service organizations; arts 
programs; and public policy programs) and reports that female directors exert their influence 
on corporate philanthropy, particularly to community service organizations and arts 
programs. Mesch et al. (2011) also investigate gender differences in charitable giving and 
find that both the likelihood and the amount of giving are greater for female than for male 
directors, even after controlling for psychological differences (i.e., empathic concern and 
principle of care measures). Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the impact of female 
directors on corporate governance and firm performance and find that the average effect of 
female directors on firm performance is negative, although female directors provide stronger 
monitoring effectiveness.  
Besides gender diversity, director nationality is also examined in relation to firm 
performance. Masulis et al. (2012) investigate directors’ nationality and document that firms 
with foreign directors make better cross-border acquisitions if those foreign directors live in 
                                                 
1
 We use the terms “board diversity” and “board heterogeneity” interchangeably in this section. 
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the same region as that of the target firm, but report that the net effect of foreign directors on 
corporate governance and firm performance is negative. 
Next, in the literature on occupational heterogeneity in a board, Hillman et al. (2000) 
argue that occupational differences in directors on the board not only strengthen expertise but 
also broaden linkages to important external constituencies. In particular, they examine US 
airline firms undergoing deregulation and conclude that firms respond to significant external 
environmental changes by altering board composition to reflect the shift in resource needs. 
Hillman et al. (2001) examine the relation between the presence of stakeholder directors (e.g., 
suppliers, employees, and community representatives) and stakeholder performance (i.e., 
corporate social responsibility) and find that certain types of stakeholder directors affect 
corporate social performance such as diversity and environment. Fich (2005) identifies 
various occupations of outside directors such as CEOs, professors, bankers, lawyers, and 
consultants and finds that (1) firms experience long-term performance improvement when 
they appoint CEOs of other firms as outside directors (i.e., CEO directors) but not when they 
appoint non-CEO directors and (2) the market reacts more strongly to the appointment of 
CEO directors than non-CEO directors. These results suggest that CEO directors are 
perceived in the market as sources of more valuable managerial talent and unique expertise. 
Güner et al. (2008) examine whether bankers on the board have distinct roles on 
corporate decisions and report that lending bankers on the board can reduce the debt ratio of a 
firm while investment bankers increase bond issuances. More recently, Cohen et al. (2012) 
identify a new type of outside director, i.e., sell-side analysts. They identify outside directors 
who have covered a firm as sell-side analysts prior to their director appointment and find that 
firms with analysts on the boards tend to subsequently increase the level of earnings 
management, which indicates the poor monitoring performance of analyst directors.  
Finally, Anderson et al. (2011) explore potential costs and benefits of heterogeneous 
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board and argue that board heterogeneity can bring more resources to the boardroom, which 
in turn improves the effectiveness or efficacy of monitoring and advising managers. They 
also compare the impact of social heterogeneity with that of occupational heterogeneity on 
firm performance and find that while both social and occupational heterogeneity have a 
positive effect on financial performance, the positive impact of occupational heterogeneity is 
50% greater than that of social heterogeneity. 
 In sum, prior literature suggests that while corporate financial performance is affected 
by both social and occupational heterogeneity in the board, corporate social performance is 
primarily influenced by board social (e.g., gender) heterogeneity. As university professors 
have become a visible source of board heterogeneity (e.g., White et al. 2013; see our Table 1), 
we argue that it is important to examine the potential impact of professor-directors on 
corporate outcomes. 
Professors and Corporate Outcomes 
Several studies have investigated the role of professors on the board (e.g., Audretsch 
and Lehmann 2006; Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Duchin et al. 2010; Fich 2005; Francis et 
al. 2014; Güner et al. 2008; Jiang and Murphy 2007; White et al. 2013). For instance, 
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) focus on the advisory role of university-based scientists and 
argue that professors provide three functions to biotech firms: 1) knowledge transfer; 2) 
signaling the quality of the firm’s research to both capital and resource markets; and 3) 
helping chart the scientific direction of the firm. Fich (2005) finds that while market reactions 
to director appointments are statistically significant when appointees are CEOs of other firms, 
these reactions lose significance when appointees are professors. Audretsch and Lehmann 
(2006) find that the likelihood of having professors on the board is affected by geographic 
proximity to a university and to an industry. More interestingly, Jiang and Murphy (2007) 
identify executives who were business school professors and document that firms with former 
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business professors as executives perform significantly better than firms without such 
executives. Güner et al. (2008) examine whether board members with financial expertise 
affect corporate policies (e.g., loan, public debt issuances, and acquisitions) and find that 
finance professors are significantly associated with lower pay-performance sensitivity, but 
not significantly associated with other policies. White et al. (2013) show that small- and mid-
cap firms are more likely to appoint professors than large firms and that the financial market, 
on average, positively (insignificantly) reacts to the appointment of professors with science, 
medicine, and engineering (business) background. Francis et al. (2014) report that the 
presence of professors is positively associated with firm financial performance and that firms 
with business-related professors exhibit the best performance, whereas Duchin et al. (2010) 
document that academic board members do not affect firm financial performance. 
In sum, while the aforementioned studies identify professors and examine their 
differential impacts on various aspects of firms, none to our knowledge solely focuses on the 
role and impact of professors on corporate social responsibility. 
Characteristics of Professors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
As other occupations, university professors have their own unique characteristics. 
Generally speaking, they are deemed socially obligated in diverse aspects by the public 
(Baumgarten 1982; Bowman 2005; Charnov 1987; Chickering and Gamson 1999; O’Connell 
1998; Tierney 1997). For example, Baumgarten (1982) argues that university teachers have a 
social obligation to help other citizens both inside and outside the classroom—the academic 
profession should have higher ethical standards to seek social benefits in lieu of its own and, 
accordingly, university professors have obligations toward at least some segments of the 
community. Charnov (1987) asserts that professors are good citizens as they must take roles 
in being ethical professionals. Tierney (1997) argues that the three key responsibilities of 
professors are research, teaching, and service to the university as well as to the community – 
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all of which contribute to society in the long-term. As educators who exercise influence upon 
the present as well as future generations, professors are obligated to fulfill their own moral 
responsibilities (O’Connell 1998) and must respect the diversity of talents (Chickering and 
Gamson 1999). Finally, Bowman (2005) argues that a teacher is obligated to base his or her 
principles on universal ethics such as humility, honesty, trust, empathy, healing, community, 
and service. It is therefore plausible that professors have, or at least are expected to have, a 
higher standard of professional ethics, compared to people working in other professions.2  
Nevertheless, there exist some studies that question the ethical standard of professors, 
particularly when it relates to professors specializing in the field of business. Indeed, business 
schools and professors have been widely criticized for failing to train responsible managers 
(Bennis and O’Toole 2005; Ghoshal 2005; Gonin 2007; Mitroff 2004; Owen 2005). Mitroff 
(2004) asserts that business educators are, at worst, guilty of being active accomplices and 
co-conspirators in corporate scandals. Ghoshal (2005) argues that business school faculty 
needs to own up to their roles in creating such scandals and denounces that these scandals 
happened because they had propagated amoral ideas and theories to their students. Similarly, 
Bennis and O’Toole (2005) argue that business schools fail to instill norms of ethical 
behavior into students. Also, Owen (2005) criticizes accounting professors for having 
neglected the importance of corporate accountability and transparency in the current 
education system. Finally, Gonin (2007) argues that the civic responsibilities of business 
scholars and business schools have been questioned as the recent ethical scandals in the 
business world arise—he attributes these ethical shortcomings to inadequate business 
education.  
                                                 
2
 The Roy Morgan “Image of Professions” Survey, conducted in the spring of 2013 in Australia, asked 
respondents to rate which professions they consider the most ethical and honest. Results indicated that among all 
30 listed professions, university lecturers were ranked in the top one-third, which was higher than the rankings 
for business executives, lawyers, and accountants. 
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Because (1) individuals’ perceptions or beliefs about professional ethics are positively 
associated with their attitude toward CSR and (2) CSR attitudes are also positively associated 
with involvement in CSR activities (Valentine and Fleishman, 2008), we argue that if 
professor-directors have higher (lower) levels of ethical standards, they are more (less) likely 
to promote CSR activities, hence firms are more (less) likely to engage in CSR activities. 
Given the relatively mixed evidence about the ethicality of professors, we take an exploratory 
approach to investigate whether firms with professors on their board of directors exhibit 
different levels of CSR performance ratings. We formulate our research question as follows: 
Research Question: Is the presence of professors on the board of directors associated 
with CSR performance ratings? 
 
Sample and Data  
Our sample is built from RiskMetrics over the period from 2003 to 2011, inclusive. 
We first identify professors on the boards of S&P 1500 firms by verifying the primary title 
and employer of individual directors’ biographic information in the RiskMetrics database. We 
then manually collect each professor’s detailed information such as affiliation, academic 
discipline, and whether the professor holds any administrative position at the university by 
searching and browsing through their school websites, personal blogs and the press websites 
(i.e., Forbes and Businessweek). With respect to identifying each professor’s academic 
discipline, we first rely on their highest degree obtained; if this information is not available, 
we use their current department affiliation (e.g., economics, business, biology, or 
mathematics) as their academic discipline.  
Next, we merge our professor sample with KLD database for CSR performance 
ratings. Considering that professors also play a major role in socialization of students, we 
believe that they will most likely influence “Community Donations”, “Employee Benefits”, 
and “Diversity Commitment” among the seven CSR dimensions in the KLD database. 
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Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the three aforementioned CSR dimensions.3 In 
particular, we measure our CSR dependent variables as the net difference between strengths 
and weaknesses of a firm’s scores in each of the three CSR dimensions from the KLD 
database.4 Further, we supplement our sample with data from RiskMetrics (director and board 
characteristics), COMPUSTAT (fundamental information), ExecuComp (insider ownership), 
Thomson Reuters 13F Institutional Holdings (Institutional ownership), and CRSP (stock 
information). As the final step, we exclude observations with missing values and obtain a 
total of 10,297 firm-years, for 97,382 firm-year-directors. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate outlier effects. All variable definitions are 
described in the Appendix.  
Table 1 shows the distributions of sample firms that have professor-directors by year 
and by industry. Panel A shows that the percentage of firms with at least one professor on the 
board is on average 38.51% in our sample. This indicates that a significant portion of S&P 
1500 firms have at least one professor-director. Panel A does not indicate any noticeable 
trend in terms of the number or the proportion of firms with professor-directors over the 
sample period. Panel B shows the variation in the proportion of firms with professor-directors 
across the Fama-French 12 industry sectors. The healthcare (consumer durables) industry has 
the highest (lowest) proportion of firms that have professor-directors, with an average of 
55.76% (20.25%) of the industry members having professor-directors. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                 
3
 As a robustness test, we also check and find that our results are qualitatively the same even when we extend 
our analysis into the other four CSR dimensions (i.e., we use a dependent variable that sums up all scores in 
seven CSR dimensions of KLD). 
4
 There may be potential concerns about the use of net difference scores, i.e., sum of strengths – sum of 
weaknesses (Allison 1990; Edwards and Parry 1993; Johns 1981). However, we choose to use such difference 
scores as our CSR dependent variables because several recent studies that use the KLD database have commonly 
done so (Barnea and Rubin 2010; Chen et al. 2008; Rekker et al. 2012). Following Barnea and Rubin (2010), we 
assume that all types of CSR strengths and weaknesses are equal in terms of their importance and costs. 
However, as a robustness check, we also replicate our empirical tests by decomposing our dependent variables 
of difference scores into strengths and weaknesses and find inferentially similar results. We discuss this issue 
further in the “Robust Test and Additional Issues” section. 
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Figure 1 reports the yearly distribution of 5,189 professor-directors by academic 
discipline and title. In Figure 1-A, we classify professors’ academic discipline into seven 
different categories (i.e., Economics and Business; Engineering and Science; Medicine; 
Politics; Law; Education; and Others) and show yearly distributions of professors in each 
category.5 Figure 1-A illustrates that while the number of professor-directors who major in 
other disciplines is relatively stable during the sample period, the number of Economics and 
Business professors is increasing (from 203 in 2003 to 248 in 2011). In fact, Economics and 
Business professors account for 41.5% of all professors in our sample and their number is 
almost ten times greater than that of Education professors. Engineering and Science 
professors and Medicine professors are the second and third largest groups, accounting for 
17.69% and 12.50% of total professor-directors, respectively.  
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1-B shows the yearly distributions of professor-directors by their respective 
administrative positions (i.e., President, Dean, Chair, Chancellor, Head, and Provost). Almost 
half (48.02%) of professors in our sample hold an administrative position, the most common 
of which is President (24.30%), followed by Dean (14.64%) and Chair (4.16%). 
Results 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics. Except for Employee Benefits, the 
CSR variables have positive mean values. The sample firms on average have 9.4 board 
members and 75.4% of the board members are independent directors. Female directors 
account for 11.4% of the positions on the board. Busy independent directors are outside 
directors who hold at least three or more directorships in other firms (Masulis et al. 2012) and 
they account for 3.5% of directors. We also find that 3.4% of our firms have an independent 
                                                 
5
 We classify majors into seven categories in a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive way. 
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director who holds more than 5% of a firm’s outstanding shares, whereas 57.6% of firms 
have CEO/Chairman duality. Finally, the mean proportion of professor-directors on the board 
is 5.1%. Other firm characteristics are consistent with prior literature that covers S&P 1500 
firms (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Masulis et al. 2012).  
Panel B of Table 2 provides a comparison between firms with and firms without 
professor-directors. Firms with professors on their board appear to outperform firms without 
such professor-directors with regards to all CSR performance rating measures (i.e., 
Community Donations, Employee Benefits, Diversity Commitment, and the composite 
measure of CSR). Also, firms with professor-directors have larger boards, more female 
directors, and more independent directors than those without; log (Sales) is significantly 
higher in firms with professor-directors than those without, indicating that large firms are 
more likely to appoint professor-directors than small firms. Finally, firms with professor-
directors are more mature than those without (30.9 versus 24.9 years), and the return 
volatility of firms with professor-directors is significantly lower than that of firms without 
(0.105 versus 0.114). Overall, results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that the presence of 
professors on the board may be influenced by certain firm characteristics. Hence, in our 
regression models, we control for various firm characteristics that may influence firms’ 
decision to appoint professors on their boards. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The Impact of Professor-Directors on CSR Performance Ratings 
We begin our analysis using the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model:  
CSR Performance Ratings = 
 β0 + β1 DPROF (or PctPROF) + β2 BoardSize + β3 PctFemale 
+ β4PctOutsider + β5 PctBusyIndepDir + β6IndDirBlock + β7 CEOChair  
+ β8 Market-to-Book + β9Log (Sales) + β10 ROA + β11 Leverage + 
β12FirmAge + β13 ReturnVolatility + β14 InsiderOwnership + β15 
InstitutionalOwnership 
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+ Year dummies + Industry dummies + ε. 
 
The above model determines CSR performance ratings as a function of the presence of 
professor-directors (i.e., DPROF and PctPROF), board-, and firm-specific characteristics. To 
mitigate concerns that the impact of professor-directors on CSR performance ratings may be 
driven by correlated omitted variables, we control for several CSR determinants suggested by 
prior research: proportion of inside directors (Wang and Coffey 1992), insider ownership and 
institutional ownership (Barnea and Rubin 2010; Oh et al. 2011), firm size (Amato and 
Amato 2007), and other board- and firm- characteristics such as CEO/Chair duality, firm age, 
profitability, and leverage (Chen et al. 2008; Barnea and Rubin 2010). We also include year 
dummies and SIC 2-digit industry dummies to capture year and industry fixed effects (e.g., 
Amato and Amato 2007). In addition, we use standard errors clustered by firm to correct for 
intra-group correlations of residuals within firms (Petersen 2009). 
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results. We examine the relation between the 
presence of professor-directors and CSR performance ratings using four different measures of 
CSR. Except for column (1), which shows an insignificant relation between Community 
Donations and an indicator for professor-directors on the board (DPROF), columns (3), (5), 
and (7) provide evidence that firms with at least one professor-director have a significantly 
higher level of CSR performance ratings. In columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), we examine 
whether CSR performance ratings increase as more professors sit on the board (PctPROF), 
and find positive and statistically significant results.  
Overall, our control variables show consistent results with prior studies (e.g., Barnea 
and Rubin 2010; Mesch et al. 2011; Oh et al. 2011; Williams 2003).6 For example, firms with 
a greater number of female directors (PctFemale) and firms with better financial performance 
                                                 
6
  To ensure that multicollinearity is not a significant issue in our study, we check and find that all VIFs 
(variance inflation factors) in the OLS regressions without year and industry fixed effects are below 1.8, 
implying no significant multicollinearity issue. We also find that our results remain qualitatively the same when 
all control variables are dropped. 
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engage more actively in CSR activities. Also, insider ownership is negatively and 
significantly associated with CSR performance ratings, supporting the notion that firms are 
reluctant to invest in CSR activities when insiders should bear high CSR expenditure.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
CSR and Professor-Directors from Different Academic Disciplines  
While we posit that professors have, or at least are expected to have, a higher level of 
social obligations than other occupations, it is important to recognize that professors 
constitute a group of heterogeneous professionals who possess different academic training, 
discipline knowledge, and scholarly experience (White et al. 2013). Accordingly, in this 
section, we examine the heterogeneous characteristics of professors and investigate whether 
the impact of professor-directors on CSR performance ratings varies with their academic 
backgrounds.  
Following White et al. (2013), we first classify professor-directors into two groups 
based on their academic fields of study: 1) business professors whose academic backgrounds 
correspond to either business, economics or law; and 2) specialized professors whose 
academic backgrounds correspond to either engineering, science or medicine. We then 
measure the proportion of business professor-directors {PctPROF (Business)} and that of 
specialized professor-directors {PctPROF (Specialized)} to examine whether they have 
heterogeneous impacts on CSR performance ratings. 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions where dependent variables are CSR 
performance ratings and the variables of interest are the percentage of either business or 
specialized professor-directors out of all board members. Interestingly, we find a clear 
distinction in the coefficients on the percentage of professor-directors between business and 
specialized academic backgrounds. That is, while the coefficients on PctPROF (Specialized) 
are all significantly positive as we find in Table 3, none of the coefficients on PctPROF 
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(Business) are significant, indicating that business professors may be relatively less ethical 
than professors in other disciplines.  
The significant and positive impact of specialized professors (e.g., engineering, 
science, and medicine) on CSR performance ratings can be explained by their relatively high 
ethical standards as educators as well as by the very nature of their academic disciplines 
(engineering, science, and medicine) that cares for firm long-term prosperity through such 
CSR activities as R&D, for example.7 However, in stark comparison, the insignificant results 
for business professors can be interpreted in line with the wide criticism of business 
professors and business schools (see Bennis and O’Toole 2005; Ghoshal 2005; Gonin 2007; 
Mitroff 2004; Owen 2005). In addition, considering that business professors are those who 
possess general business expertise that enables them to play both monitoring and advisory 
roles (White et al. 2013), they may be less likely to invest in CSR activities if they view such 
spending as less valuable for shareholders’ wealth. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
CSR and Professor-Directors with Administrative Positions  
White et al. (2013) suggest that professors have heterogeneous characteristics 
conditional on whether they hold an administrative position (e.g., President, Dean, 
Department Chair, etc.) within their universities.8 Thus, in this section, we examine the 
different characteristics of professor-directors with an administrative position 
(“administrative professor-director”, hereafter) and determine whether and how their impact 
                                                 
7
 Audretsch and Stephan (1996) argue that university-based scientists provide three functions to biotech firms: 
1) knowledge transfer, 2) signaling the quality of the firm’s research to both capital and resource markets, and 3) 
help chart the scientific direction of the firm. Thus, specialized professors’ role is to provide advice to make a 
firm succeed in the long run. 
8
 White et al. (2013) introduce some characteristics of administrative professor-directors. For example, 
administrative professors may provide appointing firms with beneficial social networks and additional access to 
resources but, at the same time, they may not be able to provide highly technical and industry-specific advice as 
it is likely that they have not been active in terms of research since they became administrators at their 
universities. 
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on CSR performance ratings is different from that of professor-directors without such 
position. 
Following White et al. (2013), we first divide professor-directors into two groups 
based on whether professors hold an administrative position at their universities. Our 
variables of interest are the proportion of administrative professor-directors {PctPROF 
(Admin)}, and that of non-administrative professor-directors {PctPROF (No Admin)}.  
Table 5 presents the OLS regression results. In column (1) where the dependent 
variable is Community Donations, both of the percentages of professor-directors with and 
without an administrative position show positive and significant coefficients, implying that 
the presence of professors, regardless of whether they hold such position or not, indeed 
increases firm CSR performance ratings with respect to community donations.  
In columns (2) and (3), while the percentage of non-administrative professor-directors 
shows positive and significant coefficients on Employee Benefits and Diversity Commitment, 
the percentage of administrative professor-directors does not exhibit statistically significant 
coefficients for those dimensions.9 Finally, when a composite measure of CSR is used as a 
dependent variable in column (4), both variables are significantly positive but the impact of 
administrative professor-directors on CSR is only statistically marginal at the 10% level.  
Overall, Table 5 shows that the impact of the presence of professor-directors on CSR 
performance ratings is less clear when professors are administrators at their universities. One 
possible explanation is that professors with an administrative job are busier with their duties 
than professors who do not hold such positions within their universities. Thus, administrative 
professor-directors may have fewer opportunities to exert their influence on firm CSR 
activities than other professor-directors. Indeed, we find that administrative professor-
                                                 
9
 According to KLD guidelines, ‘diversity commitment’ ratings take into account whether a firm hires women, 
disabled or gays/lesbians. However, these ratings do not consider occupational diversity such as hiring 
professors on the board. Thus, it is less likely that the presence of professor-directors on the board automatically 
increases its ratings for ‘diversity commitment’. 
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directors hold a significantly higher number of directorships in other firms than non-
administrative professor-directors (0.652 versus 0.495 directorships in other firms, t-stat = 
6.48).10 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Robustness Test and Additional Issues 
Endogeneity of Professor-Directors on the Board 
While the main purpose of our study is to examine the association between the 
presence of professor-directors and firm CSR performance ratings as reported in Table 3, 
there may be concerns about a potential endogeneity (or, reverse causality) issue in our OLS 
regression results. That is, firms with high CSR performance ratings may simply seek and 
appoint professors as directors on their boards, or professors may have strong incentives to 
join CSR-friendly firms for their reputation. If such factors are correlated with CSR 
performance ratings but not adequately captured by our control variables, then the presence 
of professor-directors will be correlated with error terms of the OLS regressions, thereby 
biasing our OLS coefficient estimates. We use the instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
address this endogeneity concern. The instrumental variable should be correlated with the 
presence of professor-directors, but not with error terms in the OLS regression of CSR 
performance ratings. Referring to the instrument for the presence of female directors 
introduced by Adams and Ferreira (2009), we define our instrumental variable as the 
percentage of non-professor-directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there are 
professor-directors (CONNPROF).11 Our instrumental variable is based on the intuition that, 
as argued by Adams and Ferreira (2009) for female directors, professor-directors also do not 
have enough strong business networks to obtain board directorship appointments in 
                                                 
10Although statistically insignificant, we also find that the percentage of having attendance problem (i.e., 
attended less than 75% of board meetings) is higher for professor-directors with administrative positions than 
professors-directors without administrative jobs (1.24% vs. 1.00%, t=0.83). 
11Adams and Ferreira (2009) use an instrumental variable for the presence of female directors as the fraction of 
male directors with board connections to female directors.  
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comparison to other business-related occupations (e.g., executives, bankers, and lawyers). 
Thus, if some non-professor-directors have networks or connections to a university or 
professors, it is more likely that professors will have better opportunities to sit on the board of 
the firm, thereby increasing the proportion of professor-directors. As we cannot measure the 
individual directors’ actual social connections to a university or professors, we alternatively 
rely on the information of board directorships provided by RiskMetrics and assume that a 
director has social network to professors if he or she sits on the board of other firms where 
professors also serve as directors at the same time.  
Table 6 presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Column (1) 
reports the first stage of 2SLS regression. We estimate the OLS regression where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of professor-directors on the board (PctPROF). We find 
a positive and significant coefficient (0.031, t-stat = 2.870) on CONNPROF and the result 
indicates that our instrumental variable can properly explain the endogenous variable, i.e., the 
presence of professor-directors.  
Columns (2)-(5) report the second stage results of 2SLS regressions where dependent 
variables are CSR performance ratings and the endogenous variable (PctPROF) is replaced 
with the fitted value (Fitted-PctPROF) obtained from the first stage regression. We find that 
the percentage of professor-directors is still significantly and positively associated with CSR 
performance ratings, suggesting that professor-directors indeed appear to increase the level of 
firm CSR performance ratings. All other specifications are identical to those in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
CSR and Temporal Change in the Number of Professor-Directors 
In the preceding section we provide some statistical evidence that professor-directors 
do positively affect firm CSR performance ratings. To further investigate the causal 
relationship between a firm’s CSR and the presence of professor-directors, we conduct 
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additional tests by incorporating temporal dimensions in this section. That is, we capture the 
temporal change in the presence of professor-directors and examine its relation to firm CSR 
activities.  
First, to allow for a rather long-term oriented CSR investment, we measure the change 
in the number of professor-directors over two consecutive years {△NPROF (t)} and include 
two lags of the change in the number of professor-director, △NPROF (t-1) and △NPROF (t-
2), together in the regression models.12 The untabulated results indicate that the change in the 
number of professor-directors in year t is positively associated with the composite measure of 
CSR at 10 percent level. Further, the change in the number of professor-directors in year t is 
more strongly and positively associated with the strengths of CSR performance ratings (i.e., 
strengths in community donations, diversity community, and CSR), suggesting that the 
change in the number of professor-directors is associated with the level of firm CSR 
performance ratings this year.13  
Second, we measure the dismissal of professor-directors from the board as an 
indicator that equals one if a firm begins to have no professors on its board from this year 
while it previously had, and zero otherwise {DismissPROF (t)}. We then estimate the 
regressions of CSR performance ratings on DismissPROF (t), DismissPROF (t-1), 
DismissPROF (t-2) and control variables. Untabulated results show that the past dismissal of 
professor-directors is negatively (positively) and significantly associated with the current 
level of firm CSR net performance and strengths (weaknesses). Hence, these results suggest 
that firm CSR performance ratings tend to weaken if professor-directors are dismissed in the 
                                                 
12
 We find inferentially similar results when the change in the proportion of professor-directors (△PctPROF) is 
used. 
13
 In the next section, we provide the rationale or justification for decomposing our CSR dependent variables (in 
the form of net difference scores) into CSR strengths and weaknesses. 
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preceding years.14 Overall, our additional analyses suggest that the presence of professor-
directors appear to affect firm CSR performance ratings.15 
CSR Strengths vs. Weaknesses as Dependent Variables  
Our dependent variables are measured as the net difference scores between CSR 
strengths and weaknesses, the metrics of which are widely used in prior literature that relies 
on the KLD database (e.g., Barnea and Rubin 2010; Chen et al. 2008; Rekker et al. 2012). 
However, a few studies have demonstrated that difference scores suffer from methodological 
problems such as potential unreliability, systematic and spurious correlations with their 
components (Allison 1990; Edwards and Parry 1993; Johns 1981). Thus, in this section, we 
rerun our tests using the dependent variables decomposed into strengths and weaknesses in 
CSR. We then examine which aspect of CSR performance ratings (i.e., strengths vs. 
weaknesses) is actually affected by the presence of professor-directors. Untabulated results 
show that strengths in CSR performance ratings are all positively and significantly associated 
with the presence of professor-directors. However, none of the weaknesses in CSR 
performance ratings show statistical significance with respect to the presence of professor-
directors, although the signs of their relations are all negative as expected. Taken together, 
these results imply that our findings (using net difference scores) remain qualitatively the 
same as when dependent variables are decomposed into strengths and weaknesses, and that 
professor-directors are primarily associated with firm CSR strengths. 
                                                 
14
 We were not able to find clear evidence that firm CSR performance ratings increase when a new professor-
director is added to the board. 
15
 We acknowledge some possible limitations in this section. To examine how CSR activities are associated with 
temporal changes in the presence of professor-directors, we adopt and modify a research design that LaFond and 
Watts (2008) use (i.e., CSR (t) = △Prof (t) + △Prof (t-1) + △Prof (t-2) + controls (t-1)) in which the dependent 
variable is the CSR rating level while the variables of interest are the longitudinal changes in the presence of 
professor-directors. As CSR scores provided by the KLD database are relatively sticky and insensitive over time, 
taking the change (△) of KLD variables does not capture a subtle change in CSR ratings over two consecutive 
years. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
Over the last decade, more than one third of S&P 1500 firms have appointed 
professors as directors on their boards. The extant literature provides relatively mixed 
evidence about the ethicality of professors. On one hand, professors are generally perceived 
as having, or at least being expected to have, a relatively higher standard of professional 
ethics (Baumgarten 1982; Bowman 2005; Charnov 1987; Chickering and Gamson 1999; 
O’Connell 1998; Tierney 1997). On the other hand, business professors have been widely 
criticized for not taking the initiatives in cultivating morality and setting an ethical example 
for their students  (Bennis and O’Toole 2005; Ghoshal 2005; Gonin 2007; Mitroff 2004; 
Owen 2005). The relatively mixed findings have indeed stemmed our motivation to conduct 
this study examining whether firms with academic faculty members on the board of directors 
(i.e., professor-directors) exhibit different CSR performance ratings. Our results show a 
significant and positive association between the presence of professor-directors and firm CSR 
performance ratings. Further, allowing for heterogeneous characteristics of professors (e.g., 
White et al. 2013), we find that professor-directors affect firm CSR performance ratings 
differently depending on their academic disciplines. That is, while specialized professor-
directors (i.e., engineering, science, and medicine) have a positive effect on firm CSR 
performance ratings, the presence of business professor-directors (i.e., business, economics, 
and law) does not appear to affect firm CSR performance ratings. This finding could be 
interpreted in line with the prior literature documenting the wide criticism that business 
professors have neglected the importance of corporate accountability in their education and 
failed to train responsible managers. We also find that professor-directors who hold an 
administrative position within their university exert less influence on firm CSR activities than 
professor-directors without such position. Given that administrative professors hold 
significantly more directorships in other firms than non-administrative professors, this 
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finding may suggest that administrative professors have fewer opportunities to exert their 
ethical influence on a firm’s CSR activities. Our overall results hold even after a series of 
robustness tests including issues related to endogeneity. Finally, we find that the change in 
the number of professor-directors is significantly and positively associated with the current 
level of firm CSR performance ratings and that professor-directors primarily affect and 
improve the strengths of CSR performance ratings. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature in several aspects. First, we document 
that a less-investigated but important occupation (i.e., university professor) among outside 
directors has an impact on CSR performance ratings. Considering that a significant portion of 
firms appoint at least one academic on their board of directors, we believe that it is 
worthwhile to investigate whether the presence of professor-directors affects corporate 
outcomes. Second, this study assesses how a particular type of corporate governance 
characteristic and its projected role link to a corporate activity, namely corporate social 
responsibility. Last but certainly not least, we document how professors can potentially 
contribute to society outside the classroom by showing the positive impact of professor-
directors on firm CSR performance ratings. This implies that CSR performance ratings, on 
average, are likely to increase with professors appointed in corporate boardrooms. 
As in all empirical investigations, ours is subject to some limitations. Our study 
focuses on a sample of relatively large US firms (i.e., S&P 1500). Given that interest in 
corporate social responsibility as well as the role and influence of professors may vary across 
countries (owing to their differences in terms of culture, business regulations and politics), 
the extent to which the results are generalizable outside the US setting cannot be determined. 
Further, as mentioned earlier, the KLD database is limiting in that the provided rating scores 
are relatively sticky and insensitive over time; hence, it was not desirable to take the change 
(△) of KLD variables to capture a subtle change in CSR ratings over two consecutive years. 
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Finally, we purely rely on archival data and quantitative analyses, and this does not 
necessarily give a complete picture and understanding with regards to the process of how 
professors may help firms make more socially responsible decisions. Accordingly, future 
research that may consider more qualitative explorations in the form of interviews and/or 
surveys would bring more insights on how professors on the board actually exert their moral 
values and influences into firms in undertaking CSR activities. Therefore, extensions of our 
work along each of these limiting dimensions mentioned above would appear to be warranted. 
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description 
Community Donations The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Community dimension of 
KLD. 
Employee Benefits The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Employee Relations 
dimension of KLD. 
Diversity Commitment The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in Diversity dimension of KLD. 
CSR The sum of strengths minus the sum of weaknesses in three dimensions of KLD 
(i.e., Community, Employee Relations, and Diversity). 
PctPROF The percentage of professor-directors on the board. 
DPROF 1 if a firm has professor-directors on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
PctPROF (Business) The percentage of business professor-directors on the board. Business professor is a 
professor of business, economics, or law. 
PctPROF (Specialized) The percentage of specialized professor-directors on the board. Specialized 
professor is a professor of engineering, science, or medicine. 
PctPROF (Admin) The percentage of professor-directors who hold administrative positions at their 
universities (e.g., President, Dean, Chair, Chancellor, Head, and Provost). 
PctPROF (No  Admin) The percentage of professor-directors who do not hold administrative positions at 
their universities. 
BoardSize The number of directors sitting on the board. 
PctFemale The percentage of female directors on the board. 
PctOutsider The percentage of independent directors on the board. 
PctBusyIndepDir The percentage of independent directors who hold 3 or more other directorships in 
the RiskMetrics universe firms. 
IndDirBlock 1 if a firm has an independent director who holds more than 5% of shares 
outstanding and 0 otherwise. 
CEOChair 1 if a CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Market-to-Book The ratio of market value to book value of assets, measured at the fiscal year end.  
Log (Sales) Natural logarithm of sales, measured at the fiscal year end. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation scaled by book value of total assets, 
measured at the fiscal year end. 
Leverage The book value of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of total 
assets, measured at the fiscal year end. 
FirmAge The number of years the firm has appeared in CRSP. 
ReturnVolatility Standard deviation of a firm's previous 60-month stock returns. 
InsiderOwnership The sum of shares held by top 5 executives divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
InstitutionalOwnership The average percentage of shares held by institutions during the fiscal year. 
CONNPROF The percentage of non-professor-directors on the board who sit on other boards on 
which there are professor-directors.  
 
 
 
24 
References 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309. 
Allison, P. D. (1990). Change scores as dependent variables in regression analysis. 
Sociological Methodology, 20, 93-114. 
Amato, L. H., & Amato, C. H. (2007). The effects of firm size and industry on corporate 
giving. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(3), 229-241. 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M., Upadhyay, A, & Zhao, W. (2011). The economics of director 
heterogeneity. Financial Management, 40(1), 5-38. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Lehmann, E. (2006). Entrepreneurial access and absorption of 
knowledge spillovers: strategic board and managerial composition for competitive 
advantage. Journal of Small Business Management, 44(2), 155-166. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Stephan, P. E. (1996). Company-scientist locational links: the case of 
biotechnology. The American Economic Review, 86(3), 641-652. 
Barnea, A., & Rubin, A. (2010). Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between 
shareholders. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(1), 71-86. 
Baumgarten, E. (1982). Ethics in the academic profession: a Socratic view. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 53(3), 282-295. 
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. (1991). Effects of board and ownership 
structure on corporate R&D strategy. The Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 205-
214. 
Bennis, W. G., & O’Toole, J. (2005). How business school lost their way. Harvard Business 
Review. Retrieved July 7, 2014, from http://hbr.org/2005/05/how-business-schools-lost-
their-way/ar/1.  
Bowman, R. F. (2005). Teacher as servant leader. The Clearing House: A Journal of 
Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 78(6), 257-260. 
Charnov, B. H. (1987). The academician as good citizen. P.3-20 in Payne, S. L., & Charnov, 
B. H. (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas for Academic Professionals, Springfield, IL: Charles C. 
Thomas. 
Chen, J. C., Patten, D. M., & Roberts, R. W. (2008). Corporate charitable contributions: a 
corporate social performance or legitimacy strategy? Journal of Business Ethics, 82(1), 
131-144. 
Chickering, A. W., & Gamson, Z. F. (1999). Development and adaptations of the seven 
principles for good practice in undergraduate education. New Directions for Teaching and 
Learning, 80, 75-81. 
 
 
25 
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. J. (2012). Hiring cheerleaders: board appointments of 
“independent” directors. Management Science, 58(6), 1039-1058. 
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 195-214. 
Edwards, J. R., & Parry, M. E. (1993). On the use of polynomial regression equations as an 
alternative to difference scores in organizational research. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 36(6), 1577-1613. 
Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outsider directors better than others? Evidence from director 
appointments by Fortune 1000 firms. The Journal of Business, 78(5), 1943-1972. 
Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2014). Professors in the boardroom and their impact on 
corporate governance and firm performance. Financial Management, Forthcoming. 
Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. 
Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75-91. 
Gonin, M. (2007). Business research, self-fulfilling prophecy, and the inherent responsibility 
of scholars. Journal of Academic Ethics, 5(1), 33-58. 
Güner, A. B., Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Financial expertise of directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 88(2), 323-354. 
Hill, C. W. L., & Snell, S. A. (1988). External control, corporate strategy, and firm 
performance in research-intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 577-
590. 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource dependence role of 
corporate directors: strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 235-256. 
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Luce, R. A. (2001). Board composition and stakeholder 
performance: do stakeholder directors make a difference? Business & Society, 40(3), 295-
314. 
Jiang, B., Murphy, P. J. (2007). Do business school professors make good executive 
managers? Academy of Management Perspectives, 21(3), 29-50. 
Johns, G. (1981). Difference score measures of organizational behavior variables: a critique. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 27(3), 443-463. 
LaFond, R., & Watts, R. L. (2008). The information role of conservatism. The Accounting 
Review, 83(2), 447-478. 
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012). Globalizing the boardroom – the effects of 
foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 53(3), 527-554. 
 
 
26 
Mesch, D. J., Brown, M. S., Moore, Z. I., & Hayat, A. D. (2011). Gender differences in 
charitable giving. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 
16(4), 342-355. 
Mitroff, I. (2004). An open letter to the deans and the faculties of American business schools. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 54(2), 185-189. 
O’Connell, D. M. (1998). From the universities to the marketplace: the business ethics 
journey. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(15), 1617-1622. 
Oh, W. Y., Chang, Y. K., & Martynov, A. (2011). The effect of ownership structure on 
corporate social responsibility: empirical evidence from Korea. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 104(2), 283-297. 
Owen, D. (2005). CSR after Enron: a role for the academic accounting profession? European 
Accounting Review, 14(2), 395-404. 
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Rekker, S. A. C., Benson, K. L., & Faff, R. W. (2012). Corporate social responsibility and 
CEO compensation revisited: disaggregation, market stress and gender do matter. 
Working Paper, University of Queensland. 
Roy Morgan Research. (2013). Roy Morgan Image of Professions Survey 2013 Nurses still 
Most Highly Regarded – Closely followed by Doctors & Pharmacists. Retrieved 
September 1, 2014, from http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/image-of-professions-
2013-201305020534.  
Tierney, W. G. (1997). Organizational socialization in higher education. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 68(1), 1-16. 
Valentine, S., & Fleishman, G. (2008). Professional ethical standards, corporate social 
responsibility, and the perceived role of ethics and social responsibility. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 82(3), 657-666. 
Wang, J., & Coffey, B. S. (1992). Board composition and corporate philanthropy. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 11(10), 771-778. 
White, J. T., Woidtke, T., Black, H. A., & Schweitzer, R. L. (2013). Appointments of 
academic directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. 
Williams, R. J. (2003). Women on corporate boards of directors and their influence on 
corporate philanthropy. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(1), 1-10. 
 
 
27 
Figure 1 
Yearly distributions of professor-directors at S&P 1500 firms by academic disciplines 
and administrative positions 
 
Figure 1-A 
Number of professor-directors by academic disciplines 
 
 
 
Figure 1-B 
Number of professor-directors by administrative positions 
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Table 1 
Distributions of sample firms by year and industry 
 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year # of firms 
# of firms with at 
least one 
professor 
# of firms with 
multiple 
professors 
% of firms with 
at least one 
professor 
Mean % of 
professors on a 
board, 
conditional on the 
professor 
presence 
2003 1,029  428 97 41.59% 13.16% 
2004 1,109  449 99 40.49% 13.18% 
2005 1,023  425 102 41.54% 13.29% 
2006 1,053  420 100 39.89% 13.16% 
2007 1,117  428 106 38.32% 13.54% 
2008 1,213  465 130 38.34% 13.69% 
2009 1,259  466 131 37.01% 13.63% 
2010 1,243  447 109 35.96% 13.38% 
2011 1,251  437 107 34.93% 13.28% 
           
2003-2011 10,297  3,965  981  38.51% 13.37% 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by Fama-French 12 industry classification 
Industry # of firm-years 
# of firm-years 
with at least 
one professor 
% of firm-years 
with at least one 
professor, among 
all firm-years in 
the same industry 
    
Consumer NonDurables: Food, Tobacco, Textiles, 
Apparel, Leather, and Toys 
629 254 40.38% 
Consumer Durables: Cars, TVs, Furniture, and 
Household Appliances 
237 48 20.25% 
Manufacturing: Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Furnitures, 
and Papers 
1,362 480 35.24% 
Energies: Oil, Gas, Coal Extraction, and Related 
Products 
427 124 29.04% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 355 160 45.07% 
Business Equipment: Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment 
1,847 610 33.03% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 157 71 45.22% 
Utilities 607 292 48.11% 
Shops: Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
(Laundries, Repair Shops) 
1,252 422 33.71% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 859 479 55.76% 
Finance: Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, and Trading 1,393 618 44.37% 
Others: Mines, Transportation, Hotels, Business 
Services, and Entertainment 
1,172 407 34.73% 
        
Total 10,297 3,965 38.51% 
Note The sample consists of 10,297 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2011. The table presents distributions 
of sample firms by year and industry. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A:Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
CSR performance            
Community Donations  0.116 0.615 -2 0 5 
Employee Benefits  -0.150 0.933 -4 0 5 
Diversity Commitment  0.364 1.526 -3 0 7 
CSR  0.363 2.578 -8 0 18 
             
Board characteristics            
PctPROF  0.051 0.074 0 0 0.286 
DPROF  0.385 0.487 0 0 1 
BoardSize  9.442 2.378 5 9 17 
PctFemale  0.114 0.095 0 0.111 0.375 
PctOutsider  0.754 0.127 0.364 0.778 0.923 
PctBusyIndepDir  0.035 0.077 0 0 0.375 
IndDirBlock  0.034 0.181 0 0 1 
CEOChair  0.576 0.494 0 1 1 
             
Firm characteristics            
Market-to-Book  2.651 2.253 0.496 1.988 15.033 
Log (Sales)  7.602 1.483 4.585 7.462 11.423 
ROA  0.131 0.083 -0.079 0.125 0.389 
Leverage  0.199 0.158 0 0.189 0.637 
FirmAge  27.2 19.3 3 21 84 
ReturnVolatility  0.111 0.047 0.041 0.102 0.278 
InsiderOwnership  0.026 0.056 0.00002 0.007 0.341 
InstitutionalOwnership  0.785 0.161 0.320 0.812 1 
Note The sample consists of 10,297 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2011. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample. Panel B presents comparisons of means and 
medians of firm-level characteristics between firm-years with and without professor-directors. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics (continued) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of firms with professor-directors to those without 
Variable 
Firm-years with 
professor-directors 
Firm-years without 
professor-directors Difference 
(N=3,965) (N=6,332) 
Mean Median Mean Median t-statistic z-statistic 
Community Donations 0.179 0 0.076 0 (7.79)*** (7.32)*** 
Employee Benefits -0.098 0 -0.183 0 (4.35)*** (3.61)*** 
Diversity Commitment 0.739 0 0.129 0 (19.36)*** (19.09)*** 
CSR 0.864 0 0.049 0 (14.86)*** (14.00)*** 
BoardSize 10.03 10 9.07 9 (19.85)*** (20.23)*** 
PctFemale 0.134 0.125 0.101 0.100 (17.91)*** (17.73)*** 
PctOutsider 0.771 0.800 0.744 0.750 (10.41)*** (10.37)*** 
PctBusyIndepDir 0.041 0 0.032 0 (5.62)*** (7.09)*** 
IndDirBlock 0.025 0 0.040 0 (-4.13)*** (-3.92)*** 
CEOChair 0.606 1 0.557 1 (4.95)*** (4.92)*** 
Market-to-Book 2.657 1.995 2.647 1.983 (0.22) (-0.31) 
Log (Sales) 7.962 7.831 7.377 7.222 (19.55)*** (19.64)*** 
ROA 0.129 0.123 0.132 0.126 (-1.50) (-1.65)* 
Leverage 0.205 0.195 0.196 0.185 (2.78)*** (3.48)*** 
FirmAge 30.9 25 24.9 19 (14.89)*** (14.40)*** 
ReturnVolatility 0.105 0.096 0.114 0.106 (-9.46)*** (-10.85)*** 
InsiderOwnership 0.023 0.005 0.028 0.008 (-4.58)*** (-11.39)*** 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.774 0.799 0.791 0.822 (-5.25)*** (-5.79)*** 
Note The sample consists of 10,297 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2011. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample. Panel B presents comparisons of means and 
medians of firm-level characteristics between firm-years with and without professor-directors. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3 
OLS regression analysis - CSR performance and professor-directors on the board 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
Community Donations Employee Benefits Diversity Commitment CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DPROF 0.034   0.079**   0.105**   0.227**   
  (1.521)   (2.208)   (2.324)   (2.548)   
PctPROF   0.375**   0.635**   0.700**   1.911*** 
    (2.448)   (2.544)   (2.355)   (3.074) 
BoardSize 0.014** 0.015** -0.003 -0.001 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.056** 0.062*** 
  (2.252) (2.405) (-0.362) (-0.111) (3.482) (3.739) (2.474) (2.746) 
PctFemale 0.453*** 0.436*** 0.492** 0.473** 5.427*** 5.413*** 6.963*** 6.900*** 
  (3.783) (3.646) (2.349) (2.288) (18.933) (18.884) (12.563) (12.536) 
PctOutsider 0.151* 0.148* -0.168 -0.169 0.435** 0.438*** 0.421 0.417 
  (1.818) (1.784) (-1.217) (-1.222) (2.543) (2.553) (1.341) (1.323) 
PctBusyIndepDir 0.215 0.225 -0.286 -0.271 0.088 0.102 -0.659 -0.612 
  (1.316) (1.380) (-1.398) (-1.328) (0.322) (0.374) (-1.273) (-1.183) 
IndDirBlock -0.025 -0.024 -0.129* -0.129* -0.036 -0.037 -0.242 -0.240 
  (-0.621) (-0.594) (-1.684) (-1.671) (-0.311) (-0.318) (-1.179) (-1.163) 
CEOChair 0.010 0.011 -0.068** -0.067** 0.032 0.034 -0.018 -0.015 
  (0.558) (0.589) (-2.171) (-2.142) (0.839) (0.869) (-0.235) (-0.196) 
Market-to-Book 0.012** 0.012** 0.015* 0.016* 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
  (2.056) (2.067) (1.952) (1.956) (4.339) (4.333) (4.539) (4.533) 
Log (Sales) 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.029 0.028 0.401*** 0.401*** 0.590*** 0.587*** 
  (6.596) (6.572) (1.490) (1.442) (16.070) (16.077) (10.761) (10.764) 
ROA -0.105 -0.104 0.666** 0.668** -0.708** -0.707** -0.061 -0.057 
  (-0.771) (-0.765) (2.490) (2.499) (-2.346) (-2.343) (-0.098) (-0.092) 
Leverage -0.146** -0.140* -0.381*** -0.375*** -0.729*** -0.725*** -1.272*** -1.252*** 
  (-2.028) (-1.951) (-2.996) (-2.950) (-4.681) (-4.659) (-4.230) (-4.169) 
FirmAge -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 0.003* 0.003* -0.003 -0.003 
  (-2.131) (-2.185) (-0.882) (-0.906) (1.735) (1.733) (-0.704) (-0.736) 
ReturnVolatility -0.276 -0.282 -0.396 -0.401 1.830*** 1.829*** 0.352 0.333 
  (-1.214) (-1.245) (-1.057) (-1.070) (3.692) (3.687) (0.376) (0.355) 
InsiderOwnership 0.079 0.075 -0.571** -0.572** -0.588 -0.584 -1.633** -1.639** 
  (0.524) (0.499) (-2.181) (-2.186) (-1.588) (-1.580) (-2.458) (-2.470) 
(continued to the next page) 
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(continued from the previous page) 
InstitutionalOwnership -0.165** -0.162** -0.200* -0.194* -0.156 -0.149 -0.622** -0.605** 
  (-1.992) (-1.963) (-1.718) (-1.672) (-0.959) (-0.915) (-2.017) (-1.966) 
Intercept -0.691*** -0.692*** -0.248 -0.261 -3.816*** -3.839*** -5.223*** -5.255*** 
  (-5.104) (-5.158) (-1.076) (-1.130) (-8.768) (-8.857) (-9.776) (-9.848) 
                  
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.155 0.104 0.104 0.469 0.469 0.321 0.322 
Note The table presents the results of OLS regressions of CSR performance on the presence of professor-directors and other control variables. The dependent variables are 
Community Donations (Columns 1, 2), Employee Benefits (Columns 3, 4), Diversity Commitment (Columns 5, 6), and CSR (Columns 7, 8). Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. All specifications control for year and 2-digit SIC industry fixed-effects. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4 
OLS regression analysis – CSR performance and professor-directors from different 
academic disciplines 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
Community 
Donations 
Employee 
Benefits 
Diversity 
Commitment CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PctPROF (Business) 0.081 0.594 0.488 1.162 
  (0.413) (1.642) (1.159) (1.544) 
PctPROF (Specialized) 0.711** 0.933** 1.439*** 3.084*** 
  (2.373) (2.230) (2.690) (3.380) 
BoardSize 0.015** -0.001 0.045*** 0.060*** 
  (2.403) (-0.084) (3.767) (3.140) 
PctFemale 0.450*** 0.485** 5.424*** 6.359*** 
  (3.769) (2.329) (18.902) (13.728) 
PctOutsider 0.155* -0.164 0.445*** 0.436 
  (1.874) (-1.186) (2.599) (1.619) 
PctBusyIndepDir 0.220 -0.273 0.101 0.048 
  (1.346) (-1.333) (0.371) (0.108) 
IndDirBlock -0.024 -0.127* -0.034 -0.185 
  (-0.582) (-1.646) (-0.291) (-0.943) 
CEOChair 0.011 -0.066** 0.035 -0.021 
  (0.598) (-2.114) (0.897) (-0.330) 
Market-to-Book 0.011* 0.015* 0.056*** 0.082*** 
  (1.934) (1.893) (4.217) (4.100) 
Log (Sales) 0.095*** 0.028 0.400*** 0.522*** 
  (6.571) (1.440) (16.046) (11.643) 
ROA -0.097 0.670** -0.697** -0.125 
  (-0.709) (2.503) (-2.303) (-0.235) 
Leverage -0.134* -0.367*** -0.708*** -1.208*** 
  (-1.847) (-2.890) (-4.544) (-4.690) 
FirmAge -0.002** -0.001 0.003* -0.000 
  (-2.109) (-0.864) (1.777) (-0.038) 
ReturnVolatility -0.272 -0.399 1.835*** 1.164 
  (-1.201) (-1.063) (3.704) (1.472) 
InsiderOwnership 0.101 -0.563** -0.554 -1.015* 
  (0.671) (-2.143) (-1.497) (-1.804) 
InstitutionalOwnership -0.159* -0.192* -0.144 -0.495* 
  (-1.925) (-1.655) (-0.882) (-1.937) 
Intercept -0.703*** -0.269 -3.850*** -4.821*** 
  (-5.212) (-1.159) (-8.894) (-11.445) 
          
          
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.105 0.470 0.346 
Note The table presents the results of OLS regressions of CSR performance on the presence of business and 
specialized professor-directors and other control variables. The dependent variables are Community Donations 
(Columns 1), Employee Benefits (Columns 2), Diversity Commitment (Columns 3), and CSR (Columns 4). 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All specifications control for year and 2-digit SIC industry fixed-
effects. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
OLS regression analysis - CSR performance and professor-directors with 
administrative positions 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
Community 
Donations 
Employee 
Benefits 
Diversity  
Commitment CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PctPROF (Admin) 0.400** 0.469 0.135 1.639* 
  (2.021) (1.269) (0.315) (1.891) 
PctPROF (No Admin) 0.386* 0.827** 1.181*** 2.293*** 
  (1.822) (2.571) (2.972) (2.754) 
BoardSize 0.015** -0.001 0.045*** 0.062*** 
  (2.405) (-0.114) (3.746) (2.747) 
PctFemale 0.434*** 0.470** 5.413*** 6.893*** 
  (3.632) (2.275) (18.910) (12.527) 
PctOutsider 0.147* -0.172 0.432** 0.409 
  (1.772) (-1.243) (2.519) (1.296) 
PctBusyIndepDir 0.226 -0.265 0.116 -0.599 
  (1.384) (-1.294) (0.426) (-1.154) 
IndDirBlock -0.024 -0.127* -0.034 -0.236 
  (-0.580) (-1.646) (-0.292) (-1.141) 
CEOChair 0.011 -0.067** 0.035 -0.014 
  (0.589) (-2.135) (0.895) (-0.189) 
Market-to-Book 0.012** 0.016** 0.057*** 0.109*** 
  (2.078) (1.962) (4.330) (4.545) 
Log (Sales) 0.094*** 0.028 0.402*** 0.587*** 
  (6.559) (1.450) (16.130) (10.773) 
ROA -0.105 0.664** -0.716** -0.066 
  (-0.772) (2.480) (-2.375) (-0.107) 
Leverage -0.141* -0.371*** -0.713*** -1.246*** 
  (-1.960) (-2.923) (-4.605) (-4.165) 
FirmAge -0.002** -0.001 0.003* -0.003 
  (-2.194) (-0.904) (1.765) (-0.739) 
ReturnVolatility -0.284 -0.401 1.836*** 0.328 
  (-1.255) (-1.069) (3.706) (0.350) 
InsiderOwnership 0.075 -0.574** -0.592 -1.644** 
  (0.501) (-2.187) (-1.613) (-2.478) 
InstitutionalOwnership -0.161* -0.195* -0.153 -0.604** 
  (-1.952) (-1.677) (-0.943) (-1.965) 
Intercept -0.691*** -0.260 -3.841*** -5.253*** 
  (-5.154) (-1.129) (-8.867) (-9.843) 
          
          
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.105 0.470 0.322 
Note The table presents the results of OLS regressions of CSR performance on the presence of professor-
directors with and without administrative jobs and other control variables. The dependent variables are 
Community Donations (Columns 1), Employee Benefits (Columns 2), Diversity Commitment (Columns 3), and 
CSR (Columns 4). Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All specifications control for year and 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed-effects. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 
2SLS regression analysis – CSR performance and professor-directors on the board 
 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable 
PctPROF Community Donations 
Employee 
Benefits 
Diversity 
Commitment CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fitted-PctPROF   5.952* 8.419* 29.110** 50.251** 
    (1.716) (1.800) (2.541) (2.531) 
CONNPROF 0.031***         
  (2.870)         
BoardSize -0.000 0.015* -0.001 0.045* 0.063 
  (-0.163) (1.899) (-0.081) (1.672) (1.332) 
PctFemale 0.084*** -0.053 -0.211 2.920** 2.658 
  (4.341) (-0.154) (-0.460) (2.522) (1.335) 
PctOutsider 0.023** -0.007 -0.385* -0.353 -0.929 
  (1.956) (-0.052) (-1.812) (-0.693) (-1.044) 
PctBusyIndepDir -0.060*** 0.449* 0.041 1.243* 1.329 
  (-3.605) (1.949) (0.138) (1.749) (1.070) 
IndDirBlock -0.009 0.024 -0.061 0.211 0.182 
  (-1.486) (0.381) (-0.565) (0.832) (0.413) 
CEOChair -0.002 0.018 -0.058 0.068 0.043 
  (-0.635) (0.712) (-1.501) (0.774) (0.279) 
Market-to-Book -0.000 0.014* 0.018* 0.067** 0.127*** 
  (-0.588) (1.854) (1.762) (2.427) (2.647) 
Log (Sales) 0.004** 0.065** -0.014 0.249*** 0.329** 
  (2.549) (2.454) (-0.392) (3.134) (2.287) 
ROA -0.004 -0.071 0.714** -0.538 0.231 
  (-0.159) (-0.379) (2.165) (-0.708) (0.176) 
Leverage -0.026** 0.007 -0.168 0.029 0.029 
  (-2.433) (0.055) (-0.844) (0.061) (0.035) 
FirmAge 0.000** -0.004** -0.003* -0.005 -0.016* 
  (2.232) (-2.461) (-1.669) (-1.010) (-1.938) 
ReturnVolatility 0.045* -0.527* -0.743 0.581 -1.790 
  (1.277) (-1.621) (-1.479) (0.499) (-0.867) 
InsiderOwnership 0.038 -0.119 -0.842** -1.572 -3.320* 
  (1.285) (-0.474) (-2.140) (-1.542) (-1.927) 
InstitutionalOwnership -0.003 -0.143 -0.167 -0.049 -0.434 
  (-0.313) (-1.416) (-1.212) (-0.138) (-0.730) 
Intercept -0.037** -0.191 0.340 -2.857** -2.118 
  (-1.918) (-0.699) (0.879) (-2.592) (-1.211) 
            
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 10,297 
Adjusted R2 0.094     
Regression type 
First-stage IV 
with fixed 
effects 
IV with fixed effects 
Note The table presents the results of 2SLS regressions of CSR performance on the presence of professor-
directors and other control variables. Column (1) presents the first-stage result of the 2SLS regressions. The 
instrument variable is CONNPROF which is the percentage of non-professor-directors on the board who sit on 
other boards on which there are professor-directors. Columns (2)-(5) presents the second-stage results of the 
2SLS regressions. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All specifications control for year and 2-digit SIC 
industry fixed-effects. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
